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ABSTRACT
The War Without a Name: The Use of Propaganda in the
Decolonization War of Algeria
Benjamin J. Sparks
Department of French and Italian, BYU
Master of Arts
The Algerian war for independence, 1954-1962, also known as the War Without a Name
due to its lack of recognition as a war by the French government, remains an indelible scar on the
face of France. The Algerian war represents ―one of the most critical moments in modern
French history since the French Revolution‖ (Le Sueur 256), putting into question the motto of
the French republic, ―liberté, égalité, fraternité‖. This thesis will show that although the French
won the war militarily they lost the war of ideas, that of propaganda and persuasion. Thus, this
thesis will demonstrate that propaganda by the French for the aims of maintaining a French
Algeria should have played a larger role than is evident.
The use of propaganda and persuasion dates from the beginning of Greek analysis of
rhetoric and has been used in various environments and circumstances throughout the ages in
order to persuade the masses towards the opinions and ideals of the propagandist. In Algeria, the
message presented by the French through propaganda did not attain the desired result,
maintaining a French Algeria. The combination of the Algerian determination for independence
and the ineffective propaganda by the French resulted in a humiliating loss for the French forces
and the loss of territory deemed integral to French society. After over 130 years of colonial rule,
and 8 grueling years of revolutionary war, Algeria received its independence.

Keywords: France, Algeria, War, Propaganda, Decolonization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first of all, like to thank my loving wife, Megan, for all of her support. I am also
indebted to those friends and colleagues who provided their thoughts and suggestions along the
way. I am grateful for my committee chair, Yvon LeBras, and for the members of my committee
for their willingness to work with me and provide suggestions and comments.

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
Colonization ................................................................................................................................ 2
Previous Research/Literature Review ......................................................................................... 3
Research Methods ....................................................................................................................... 5
2. BASIC PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES ................................................................................. 8
Definition .................................................................................................................................... 8
Source .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Context ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Time .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Media......................................................................................................................................... 10
Audience.................................................................................................................................... 11
3. PROPAGANDA IN WARFARE ............................................................................................. 12
World War I .............................................................................................................................. 13
World War II ............................................................................................................................. 14
The Cold War ............................................................................................................................ 16
The Indochina War .................................................................................................................... 16
History of the Poster.................................................................................................................. 17
History of the Leaflet ................................................................................................................ 18
4. A WAR WITHOUT A NAME ................................................................................................. 19
A Brief History of the War ........................................................................................................ 19
5. PROPAGANDA FOR A FRENCH ALGERIA ...................................................................... 26
Diffusion of French Propaganda ............................................................................................... 26
Propaganda towards the French ................................................................................................ 29
Propaganda towards the Algerians ............................................................................................ 33
6. PROPAGANDA FOR AN ALGERIAN ALGERIA ................................................................ 63
Diffusion of Propaganda for an Algerian Algeria ..................................................................... 64
Propaganda towards the Algerians ............................................................................................ 65
iv

Propaganda towards the French ................................................................................................ 68
7. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 79
Similarities and Differences ...................................................................................................... 79
Patterns ...................................................................................................................................... 80
Evolution of Propaganda ........................................................................................................... 82
Effects of Propaganda ............................................................................................................... 82
In/Effectiveness of Propaganda during the War ....................................................................... 83
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................... 88
Important Dates/Chronology of the war.................................................................................... 88
Works Cited .................................................................................................................................. 90

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Combat Propaganda........................................................................................................ 15
Figure 2 Aux urnes citoyens ......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 3 Poster Board ................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 4 Les complices ................................................................................................................. 28
Figure 5 Plus d'Algérie française .................................................................................................. 29
Figure 6 55 Millions de Français .................................................................................................. 31
Figure 7 Le Fellagha assasin vous vole vos économies ................................................................ 33
Figure 8 Le Fellagha assasin vous vole vos économies (rendered) .............................................. 35
Figure 9 Qui te délivrera ............................................................................................................... 36
Figure 10 Un même cœur un seul drapeau tous français .............................................................. 38
Figure 11 Parlons pour défendre notre vie .................................................................................... 39
Figure 12 Tout le monde parle ...................................................................................................... 41
Figure 13 Engage-toi..................................................................................................................... 43
Figure 14 Si vous ne le croyez pas................................................................................................ 45
Figure 15 Veux-tu toujours connaître le barrage .......................................................................... 47
Figure 16 Les chacals se mangent entre eux ................................................................................. 49
Figure 17 Venez construire une Algérie de plus en plus française ............................................... 51
Figure 18 De Gaulle c'est la paix .................................................................................................. 53
Figure 19 Hors-la-loi..................................................................................................................... 55
Figure 20 Pacifier Unir ................................................................................................................. 57
Figure 21 Algérie Tunisie ............................................................................................................. 59
Figure 22 Un même cœur un seul drapeau 53 millions de Français ............................................. 61
Figure 23 Vive l'Algérie musulmane ............................................................................................ 64
Figure 24 Grand Cirque ................................................................................................................ 64
Figure 25 Harkis! .......................................................................................................................... 65
Figure 26 12 Millions de Français ................................................................................................ 68
Figure 27 Négociation pour la paix et l'amitié .............................................................................. 71
Figure 28 Oui pour l'Algérie nouvelle .......................................................................................... 73
Figure 29 Pour nos enfants la paix en Algérie .............................................................................. 75
Figure 30 L'Heure du plastic pour une enfant............................................................................... 76
Figure 31 Oui à la paix.................................................................................................................. 77

vi

1. INTRODUCTION
The Algerian war for independence, 1954-1962, also known as the War Without a Name due to
its lack of recognition as a war by the French government, remains an indelible scar on the face
of France. The Algerian war represents ―one of the most critical moments in modern French
history since the French Revolution‖ (Le Sueur 256), shaking the very foundations of France and
putting into question the motto of the French republic, ―liberté, égalité, fraternité‖.
The use of propaganda and persuasion dates from the beginning of Greek analysis of
rhetoric and has been used in various environments and circumstances throughout the ages in
order to persuade the masses towards the opinion and ideals of the propagandist. This thesis will
show that although the French won the Algerian war militarily1 they lost the war of ideas, that of
propaganda and persuasion, and as a result relinquished to Algeria its independence.
In Algeria, the message presented by the French through propaganda did not attain the
desired result, maintaining a French Algeria. This defeat can be attributed to the failure of the
propaganda to influence its target audience. This thesis will also analyze the effectiveness of the
propaganda during the war. This issue has not yet been discussed and remains open as Nacéra
Aggoun has stated, ―The verdict on the effectiveness of this propaganda and on the issue of
whether or not the Algerian people were receptive to this approach remains open‖ (198).
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The idea that the war was won militarily will not be discussed in this work, but others such as
Alexander and Keiger have discussed this and I will base this statement on their previous
research. Ted Morgan has stated, ―The French might be winning the war on the ground, with its
highly effective barriers on the Tunisia and Morocco borders, and its 1959 offensive that broke
up large rebel bands‖ (267). Jacques Ellul said, ―Without going into details, I think one could,
without being taxed with error, advance the view that at the end of 1958 the war was won
militarily‖ (FLN Propaganda 16).
1

The Algerian war is notorious for its use of guerilla warfare and terrorism, but what
remain to be discussed are the uses of propaganda by both the French and the Algerians and the
effects of this propaganda on the outcome of the war.
Colonization
Algeria was invaded by the French in 1830 and in 1834 France had annexed the occupied areas.
By 1848 Algeria had become an official and integral part of France with the creation of
départements in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. The initial conquest of Algeria proved to be a
failure in ―French policy, behavior, and organization‖, but according to the constitutional
monarchy under Louis-Philippe, ―the occupation should continue for the sake of national
prestige‖ (Metz). According to the French, ―Algeria was no El Dorado; in the early years of the
French occupation it was not even an inviting land‖ (Talbott 10). Algeria would remain under
colonial rule for the next 132 years, where it would suffer much injustice and inequality.
Algeria differed from the other French colonies in that it was the closest to Metropolitan
France; it was merely a day‘s journey from Marseille to Algiers. Algeria was also the only
African French colony to receive departmental status and because of this it had a large
population of European settlers which later became known as the Pieds Noirs; ―with nearly
900,000 inhabitants, one third of them Arabs, Algiers was France‘s second largest city, bigger
than Lyon or Marseille‖ (Morgan 119).
On June 14, 1830 the French armada landed at Sidi-Ferruch in response to an
embarrassing incident where the dey of Algiers ―struck a French official for the non-payment of
accrued debts‖ (Gosnell 15). The purpose of this action by the French military was to remedy
damaged French prestige, but also stemmed from the yearning to secure North African resources.
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On July 14, 1865, a Senatus Consulte defined native Algerian Muslims as French
subjects but they would not become naturalized French citizens unless they renounced their
rights and duties under Muslim law. ―All persons were not equally French in colonial society,
whether one measured Frenchness by citizenship rights, cultural practices, or other barometers‖
(Gosnell 218). It was only in the three departmental cities that French rule and identity existed;
in the rest of the vast southern country, Arab and Berber identity continued.
The colonial education in Algeria created an inequality amongst the indigenous
population. The education directed towards the Arabs and Berbers focused on vocational or
agricultural studies, they were taught what to do, not what to know. It was not until 1949 that
educational reform changed the school system and Europeans and Algerians shared classrooms.
Algeria‘s struggle for independence is a direct result of 130 years of French colonial
oppression; ―Colonial space represented a blank slate on which French colonial desires could be
imposed‖ (Gosnell 15).
Previous Research/Literature Review
Academic research regarding the Algerian war has only begun to come to light in the past twenty
years. Much of the discussion concerning the war focuses on the acts of torture by the French
army and the terrorism committed by the Algerian‘s. Very little attention has been directed
towards the propaganda and its effects during the war. The reasoning for this lack of discussion
revolves around the fact that access to French archives for the war remains limited. ―Restricting
access to archives is one way the French state has been able to occlude the war‖ (McCormack
138). I will here provide a brief summary of articles and books directed towards this study.
Nacéra Aggoun in ―Psychological Propaganda during the Algerian War – Based on a
Study of French Army Pamphlets‖ published in 2003— discusses the use of propaganda through
3

Army pamphlets produced by the 5e Bureau, the French Army‘s psychological warfare unit. In
her conclusion she states, ―the study of the use of propaganda in the Algerian War is significant
on a number of levels and contributes a major dimension to the historiography of that war‖ (199).
Jacques Ellul, a philosopher and sociologist at the University of Bordeaux, has focused
much attention on the use of propaganda and the formation of attitudes. Ellul has also written a
short booklet on FLN propaganda entitled FLN Propaganda in France during the Algerian War,
published in 1982 where he discusses the FLN‘s use of propaganda in métropole France.
Souvenirs and memoires have also mentioned in passing the use of propaganda. In My
Battle of Algiers, a memoire by Ted Morgan, the author discusses his time serving in the French
Army in Algerian war. During part of his time in the war he was assigned as a propaganda
officer stationed in Algiers. In his memoire he recounts the events and mentions articles
published in the newspapers falsifying stories and events during the war. Saadi Yacef has also
mentioned his activities as a leader of the FLN during the Battle of Algiers in Souvenirs de la
Bataille d’Alger, including his partaking in the nationalist movement which consisted of
circulating propaganda among the native Algerians.
Other books are dedicated to imagery during the war and thus include examples of
propaganda but with minimal to no discussion or analysis concerning the topic. These books
include: La guerre d’Algérie de la conquête à l’indépendance 1830-1962 by Pierre Vallaud, The
Algerian War and the French Army: Experiences, Images, Testimonies by Martin Alexander and
La Guerre d’Algérie by Peter Batty.
In addition to the previously mentioned books propaganda during the Algerian war is
briefly mentioned in books discussing psychological warfare, such as La guerre psychologique
by François Géré and Psychological Warfare by Paul Linebarger. Propaganda is not the sole
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tool employed in psychological warfare and due to this these books focus much attention on
torture and scare tactics rather than the use of propaganda.
Research Methods
In order to illustrate the thesis statement I will focus my attention on leaflets and posters as forms
of propaganda. I will analyze the propaganda with an emphasis on semiotics and typography.
Semiotics comes from the Greek word σημεῖον or the transliterated version sēmeion, meaning
sign. Thus, semiotics is the study of signs and symbols. This is a linking of symbols, signs, and
codes to a meaning; a driver who sees a red octagon will stop because there is a meaning, that of
stopping, associated with that sign. Some symbols are universal while others are unique to a
culture, a peace sign gesture made by raising the pointer and middle finger with the palm facing
the one giving the gesture in America is harmless, while in England it is a vulgar symbol.
The more an individual participates in the society in which he lives, the more he will
cling to stereotyped symbols expressing collective notions about the past and the future
of his group. The more stereotypes in a culture, the easier it is to form public opinion,
and the more an individual participates in that culture, the more susceptible he becomes
to the manipulation of these symbols. (Ellul, Propaganda 111)
Language, according to Saussure, is an essential element of semiology, but propaganda
often uses language that contradicts the symbol or sign; ―on relève souvent le forçage du
message photographique par un texte de commentaire qui ne s‘y rapporte pas…Elle procède
d‘une grave erreur quant à la sémiologie de l‘image. Il est impossible de fausser par le texte la
signification d‘une image. En revanche il est possible de produire ou de choisir d‘interpréter‖
(Géré 236).
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In essence, I will focus on the visual nature of these documents. I have chosen to omit
such media of propaganda as radio, television and newspapers. This is due to the fact that
leaflets and posters were more abundant and more readily accessible by the Algerians and thus
had more of an impact on their beliefs and opinions. According to recent studies, ―messages are
best comprehended and recalled when written‖ (Myers 243) because the reader is able to read
and study the message at their own pace. Aggoun states that, ―In addition to the violence of
police methods and the use of torture, the development of propaganda and the classic tools
offered by pamphlets, posters and handouts were at the forefront of [French] army action on the
ground‖ (193). I have also decided to omit these other forms of propaganda in order to narrow
the field of study.
I will begin the initial analysis of these leaflets and posters by focusing on seven elements:
source, context, time, audience, medium, subject and mission (Linebarger 43-4). These seven
elements help shed light on the nature of the propaganda. When defining the source it is
necessary to determine where the propaganda originated, and whether it is white, grey or black.
Time is also an essential element to the analysis of the propaganda because the very nature of the
propaganda relies on the timing of its release and provides also a context in which the
propaganda occurs. Along with time, the audience to whom the propaganda is targeted is
essential and can explain the subject. The subject of the propaganda deals with the aims and
objectives, in essence what ideal is to be propagated. The mission of the propaganda is the
desired end result of the propagandist. With the use of these seven elements, the preliminary
analysis of the propaganda is facilitated greatly and an elementary understanding of the
propaganda is established. With this initial understanding, a more in depth analysis is begun
dealing with semiology, because propaganda is in essence a ―deceitful manipulation of
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symbols‖ (Jackall 5). The propaganda will also be analyzed typographically which is the
formatting, layout and composition of the text. Finally, the effects and effectiveness of the
propaganda will be analyzed.
The leaflets and posters that I have chosen to analyze have been extracted from various
sources, most coming from previously published books containing images of leaflets and posters.
The images from these books that I have chosen are not treated with any previous analysis but
are simply presented as images representing the war. I have limited myself to the material in
these books due to the difficult nature in accessing government archives, which to this day are
not officially on file or are subject to strict codes of secrecy.
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2. BASIC PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
Definition

First of all, in a study devoted to the use of propaganda during a period of war, one must
understand the definition and nature of propaganda that will be discussed. Propaganda by the
masses is commonly understood as a spreading of information for the purpose of persuading
opinions and beliefs. In Propaganda and Persuasion, Dr. Victoria O‘Donnell defines
propaganda as ―the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions,
and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist‖ (6).
The most basic function of propaganda is to shape perceptions and, as Hitler stated in
Mien Kampf, ―The task of propaganda is to attract followers‖ (474). From ancient Greece to
Alexander the Great to Julius Caesar to Catholicism to the Crusades and on to the modern era
propaganda has attempted to do just this.
Originally the term in Latin meant to ―propagate‖ or to ―sow‖. In 1622, the Roman
Catholic church took this term and eliminated the neutrality of the word as they established ―the
Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, meaning the sacred congregation for propagating the
faith of the Roman Catholic Church‖ (Jowett 2). The term propaganda came to have a negative
connotation as the Roman Catholics had the intent of spreading their religion and beliefs to the
New World while opposing the beliefs of the Protestants. From this point on the term
propaganda is used to suggest a negative persuasion:
Propaganda is much more than belief manipulation, thought control, and persuasive
language…it plays upon perplexity; it cultivates confusion; it exploits expectations; it
poses as information and knowledge; it generates belief systems and tenacious
convictions; it supplies ersatz assurances and certainties; it skews perceptions; it
8

systematically disregards superior epistemic values such as truth and truthfulness,
understanding and knowledge; it discourages rationality, reasoning, and a healthy respect
for rigor, evidence, and procedural safeguards; it promotes the easy acceptance of
unexamined beliefs and supine ignorance. It handles truths and information as mere
instruments (Cunningham 176).
The use of propaganda did not begin with the Roman Catholic Church at this time, but sprang
from Greek origins with the study of rhetoric.
Source
When discussing sources of propaganda it is important to take note whether the source is white,
grey or black. The best way to determine the source of the propaganda is to ask the simple
question, ―Who has the most to gain from this message?‖
The source of white propaganda is truthfully stated and comes from an open and
identifiable source. The information contained in white propaganda is generally or most likely
accurate. Propaganda from white sources has a tendency to be a gentler mode of persuasion and
is most prevalent in public relations where the message is most likely to be accurate.
Black propaganda originates from false sources and its purpose is to spread lies and
deceptions; it is in essence ―creative deceit‖ (Jowett 13). The critical element of black
propaganda is the willingness of the audience to accept the credibility or power of the source. If
the credibility or might of the source is questioned then the propaganda may be ineffective or
misunderstood.
Grey propaganda is somewhere in between white and black propaganda; it can be seen as
a combination of both black and white. The source of the information cannot be correctly
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identified and the accuracy of that information is questionable as well. The information of grey
propaganda tends to be fragmented or misleading.
Context
The context in which the propaganda takes place is an essential element because it relates to the
prevalent moods of the times and thus the context is an understanding of the social and political
climate. In the analysis of propaganda one must understand the cultural milieu of the time;
―Propaganda is a unique phenomenon that results from the totality of forces pressing in upon an
individual in his society, and therefore cannot be duplicated in a test tube‖ (Ellul, Propaganda
vii). Thus, in order to study propaganda it is essential to understand these ―forces‖ which shed
light on the nature of the material being propagated.
Time
Linked with the context surrounding propaganda is the time period in which the message is
propagated. It is important in the analysis of propaganda to know when the messages are
distributed. Knowing whether a propaganda document is distributed at the beginning, middle, or
end of a conflict is essential in the analysis of the message. This is because the meaning of the
message will most likely be misunderstood by the analyst if the period in which the message is
circulated is inaccurate.
Media
The media of propaganda are vast and ―where there is a communication channel, there is also a
potential propaganda medium‖ (Jowett 205). The vast array of propaganda media includes: word
of mouth, coins, symbols (monuments and statues), les Chansons de Geste (La Chanson de
Roland as propaganda for war and the crusades), leaflets (beginning in the 16th century), playing
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cards, books, posters, music, radio, television, movies, photos, etc. Different media produce
different effects on a population. Radio, television, and movies will not be as efficient among a
poorer working class, whereas, leaflets and posters will be more widely received among a poorer
class.
Audience
―The successful propagandist is able to discern the basic beliefs, needs, or fears of the audience
and to play upon those‖ (Jowett 49). The knowledge and understanding of the audience‘s
cultural and religious beliefs are vital in the creation and analysis of propaganda. This is because
propaganda plays on images and symbols that are unique to the targeted audience. As previously
discussed it is also essential to understand the audience to which the propaganda is directed
because the media used to transmit the propaganda relies purely on the audience.
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3. PROPAGANDA IN WARFARE
Propaganda in warfare ―commences long before actual hostilities break out or war is declared. It
also continues long after peace treaties have been signed and soldiers have gone back to their
homes‖ (Jowett 204). Before the commencement of war, propaganda is a substitute for physical
violence, and throughout the war it is an appendage to it. In psychological warfare, ―the
propagandist is dealing with a foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by
psychological means so that the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his beliefs and actions‖
(Ellul, Propaganda xiii). When the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his actions, one
resulting effect is the defection of enemy troops, which during warfare is a desired result of
propaganda.
Jowett states that, ―the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience
with a related objective‖ (3). Such is the case when a government is attempting to instill a sense
of patriotism and support in a war effort, and this is done through language and images, ―shaping
perceptions is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters,
symbols, and even architectural structures are developed‖ (Jowett 6). Thus, in order to shape the
perceptions of the masses during warfare the use of propaganda is a vital aspect. According to
the Psychological Warfare Branch of the U.S. 5th Army, psychological warfare is ―one of its
tools for defeating enemies‖ (Psychological Warfare Branch 7). Harold D. Lasswell states that,
―propaganda attains eminence as the one means of mass mobilization that is cheaper than
violence, bribery or other possible control methods‖ (17).
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The use of propaganda is not new to the modern era of war, it stems back as far as 490
BC with the Greek struggles against the Persians2. The use of propaganda in war continues as
can be seen in the Crusades where les Chansons de Geste became very popular forms of stories
which generally had the intent of propagating the ideas of chivalry. La Chanson de Roland, an
epic poem of the 12th century, served as a form of propaganda ―for the idea of combat in the
noble cause and helped establish the romance of all the attendant pomp and ceremony associated
with chivalry‖ (Jowett 65).
More recent examples of propaganda in warfare can be seen in World War I, World War
II, The Cold War, The Indochina War, and The Vietnam War3.
World War I
World War I, also known as the Great War or the War to End All Wars, lasting from 1914-1918,
made great use of modern mass media in ways that had never been used before. It was during
this time period that propaganda achieved greater significance than before, ―In no previous
conflict had ‗words‘ been so important‖ (Jowett 209). War was no longer simply being waged
on the battlefield but had stretched out to the civilian population as a war of words and ideas.
Propaganda ―was developed and used to bring about cooperation between the industrialized
society and the fighting armed forces‖ (Jowett 162).
Propaganda was used extensively on both sides as ways to encourage the general
population to support the war efforts. One way of supporting the war effort was to enlist and
2

Themistocles, the Athenian naval commander, provided Xerxes, the son of the Persian king,
with disinformation concerning the reliability of his newly acquired Greek soldiers. This
disinformation appeared to have come from Xerxes own sources, yet the true creator of this
disinformation was Themistocles. Through Themistocles‘ use of propaganda, the Persians lost
the war and were eventually forced to leave Greece.
3
I am here omitting a brief analysis of propaganda in more recent wars such as the Gulf War,
The War in Afghanistan, and The War in Iraq due to their irrelevance concerning the Algerian
war, which predates these wars.
13

much propaganda was directed towards this. When the United States was on the brink of
entering the war, the Germans sunk the Lusitania where 128 Americans were killed. The United
States did not hesitate to use this as a means to encourage enlisting, a poster that appeared one
week after the event stated, ―Remember the Lusitania! Enlist To-day‖. During World War I the
purpose of American propaganda was to sell the war to Americans, to enlist their support
monetarily and to arouse hatred for the enemy. In fact, the United States distributed more than
100 million posters and pamphlets during the war (Jowett). World War I used radio
transmissions as they had never been used before, and they came to be ―considered to be the new
medium for shaping public attitudes‖ (Jowett 162).
World War II
World War I saw a huge rise in the use of propaganda and also caused a great concern about the
persuasive powers of the mass media on the opinions and attitudes of the population. Nazi
propaganda during World War II played upon these fears. Hitler‘s aim in the propaganda
campaign was to ―avoid abstract ideas and appeal to the emotions‖ and to ―put forth only one
side of the argument‖ (Jowett 237). Here we have a perfect example of creative deceit and black
propaganda; the Nazis were not concerned with the validity of the message propagated. Hitler
would embrace propaganda so much that he would meet almost every day with his minister in
charge of propaganda, Goebbels.
Nazi propaganda was aimed at three main audiences, the native Germans living in other
countries, the Nazi party, and the Allied Forces. The propaganda efforts directed towards
Germans living in foreign countries tried to alienate them from their new countries implying that
their blood heritage was stronger than their ties to their new country. The propaganda towards
the Nazi party was aimed at demonstrating the military prowess and cultural greatness of
14

Germany. The propaganda directed towards these two audiences differed greatly from the
propaganda directed towards the Allied Forces.
The propaganda directed towards the Allied Forces is seen as malicious and deceitful.
One such example was a billboard placed in northern France that stated, ―Soldiers of the
Northern Provinces, licentious British soldiery are sleeping with your wives and raping your
daughters‖ (Jowett 14). The French soldiers recognized this as blatant lies and simply replied by
painting on the sign that they were from the south and did not care.
The Allied forces used propaganda in warfare as well, as can be seen in the following
document by the U.S. Army‘s combat propaganda team during the war:

Figure 1

15

This document shows that the U.S. Army saw the effective nature of propaganda and then
justifies its use in the first three statements and then states, ―That is why the Fifth Army will
continue to use it‖ (Psychological Warfare Branch 3).
The main propaganda medium used during World War II was the radio, which was very
effective. This is due to the fact that the countries that were targeted by the propaganda had a
high standard of living and the majority of the population possessed radios in their homes.
―International radio broadcasts have at times been a potent force in shaping the world of
propaganda in the 20th century, and they are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future‖ (Jowett
138).
The Cold War
The Cold War, which lasted from 1947 to 1991, continued the use of radio as a means of
propagating messages. The Americans used a radio program called the Voice of America, which
provided information for those behind the Iron Curtain, but was ―ideologically injected to
manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and freedom‖ (Jowett 9). Posters were also
widely used as a medium of propaganda to bring about fear concerning communism; American
propaganda focused on showing communists as murderers and rapists.
The Indochina War
The medium of propaganda during the Indochina War differed greatly from the previous wars
discussed here. This is due to the standard of living of the Vietnamese who were the target of the
propaganda. Posters and leaflets were more predominant than radio messages. Psychological
warfare had evolved and adapted to best suit its needs, so instead of radio messages the French
mounted large speakers to airplanes and flew over villages spreading propaganda messages. The
Vietnamese attempted the same thing but by simply piling speakers on top of each other and
16

announcing loud messages. Thus, it can be seen that the media used for propaganda depends
greatly upon the audience and resources of the disseminator.
History of the Poster
The poster has been around as a means of communication since antiquity, but became more
widely spread with the invention of the printing press and moveable type.4 In the sixteenth
century posters mainly contained text; illustrations and insignias were rarely used. In 1534,
Protestants nailed a poster or a placard on the door of King Francis I‘s bedchamber, which
outraged the king and changed his political views towards Protestants. Then in 1539, Francis
saw it necessary to regulate the putting up of posters and it was then forbidden in 1653 under
penalty of death to print or display posters without official permission (Müller-Brockmann 26).
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries illustrations became more predominant and were
often used by governments in order to recruit conscripts.
The poster continued to develop artistically and was soon associated with art exhibits and
sporting events. During the World War I and II the use of the poster changed into a popular
medium for political propaganda with such posters as Rosy the Riveter and Uncle Sam declaring,
―I want you for U.S. Army‖. Nazi Germany also thrived on posters during World War II, which
portrayed the strength of the army. ―L‘affiche demeure dans les années cinquante un vecteur
privilégié des propagandistes, qu‘ils soient gouvernementaux, partisans, ou éventuellement
commerciaux ‖ (Gervereau, La France 178).
The purpose of posters during wartime is to ―speak to us and secretly appeal to weak
spots of which we ourselves are not aware…and then channel [our feelings] so that we do what

4

Many books have been written on the topic of the history of the poster, I will here give a
concise history as it relates to the subject at hand. Thus, I will omit the history of the poster as it
relates to advertising and art.
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the sponsor of the poster wants us to do‖ (Gallo 9-10). Posters are most commonly placed in
public spaces with a large traffic flow in order to reach the largest percentage of the population
as possible.

History of the Leaflet
The distribution of leaflets can be seen as the most productive means of reaching a target
audience because it delivers the message directly into the hands of the audience. The use of
leaflets is most commonly seen in advertising and psychological warfare where there is a need to
get the message to the audience directly and in a timely fashion. The distributor of leaflets in
psychological warfare attempts to alter the behavior and opinions of individuals and groups in a
war torn society. There are different types of leaflets, strategic leaflets and tactical leaflets.
Strategic leaflets aim at the end result of the conflict and tactical leaflets focus on immediate
results.
Leaflets, unlike posters, are often distributed by hand or dropped by airplanes, balloons,
or helicopters. The beginning of leaflet dropping originates during World War I, where it is
estimated that more than 100 million posters and pamphlets were distributed by the U.S., but was
more widely used during World War II where they were dropped from bombers or shot into
enemy territory by shells.
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4. A WAR WITHOUT A NAME
A Brief History of the War
The conflict between France and Algeria, lasting from 1954-1962, was not formally recognized
by the French government as a ―war‖ until June of 1999, 37 years after the conflict had ended. It
had become an historical blind spot and a war without a name which can be considered one of
the longest and cruelest wars of decolonization. The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale
(FLN) acted as the leading force for Algeria in its struggle for independence along with their
military counterpart the Armée de libération Nationale (ALN). A growing desire for an
independent Algeria had been in the works for many years. With a blossoming of Algerian
nationalism after the outbreak of World War I, Algerians were fighting alongside Frenchmen and
dying for France, yet the two were unequal, lacking the same basic rights.
November 1, 1954 marked the beginning of the Algerian war with what is now known as
the All Saints‘ Day massacre. The massacre was conducted by the FLN against French military
installations, police posts, warehouses, communication facilities and public utilities in an attempt
to incite an open rebellion calling for an autonomous state. The French government, with little
intelligence on the issue, immediately blamed the MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des
Libertés Démocratiques) and imprisoned its leaders. These actions left the ―FLN with a
monopoly on radical nationalism, with the FLN free to proselytize while their rivals languished
in prison‖ (Talbott 37).
The French responded in full force against the revolutionaries after the attack on All
Saint‘s Day. In the summer of 1954, the French had divided Algeria into six wilayas (provinces).
Within the year following the initial attacks, three of the six wilayas were vacant of
revolutionaries and arms; the violence was kept along the eastern wilayas. By 1955, France had
killed or arrested most of the founders of the FLN (Talbott).
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August 20, 1955, Algerian revolutionaries massacred at least 123 Algerians and settlers
in the city of Philippeville.5 The ―ALN regulars pushed before them several hundred peasants
whom they had convinced the hour of deliverance lay at hand. Armed with axes, knives, sickles,
and such firearms as were available, the peasants set upon settlers and Algerians alike….Some
they hacked to death; others they disemboweled; they slit the throats of still others‖ (Talbott 4950). This action caused Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria from 1955 to 1956, to
seek more repressive means rather than reforms to control the revolutionaries.
By this point the war in Algeria had become an important political debate. It was
considered the most important issue facing the nation and was the result of multiple Prime
Ministers resigning, leaving France without a government for 58 days in 1957. During the early
months of 1956, precedence was given to crushing the insurgency over political reform, and the
policy towards Algeria was declared as pacification, ―a euphemism old as the conquest of
Algeria for the application of military force‖ (Talbott 61). Throughout these events, the
government maintained that the war in Algeria was merely a rebellion of French citizens and the
actions taken were purely used for the maintaining of order.
The government had maintained that France faced a rebellion of French citizens.
Rebelling against their own government put these citizens hors la loi. They were outlaws,
persons beyond the law yet at the same time subject to it. The government, according to
this view of the matter, had sent troops to restore order in North Africa, just as it might
dispatch police to quell a riot in Brittany. In Algeria the army was not fighting a war but
conducting operations for the maintenance of order. (Talbott 51).

5

Philippeville is now known as Skikda and is located 130 miles from the Tunisian border and
approximately 50 miles north of the département of Constantine.
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September 30, 1956, three women working for the FLN planted bombs in three separate
locations: a milk bar, La Caféteria, the Algiers airport. These bombs went off around five
o‘clock killing three and injuring 46, but the bomb placed at the airport failed to explode. These
bombings marked the beginning stages of what has now become known as the Battle of Algiers,
which lasted until October 8, 1957.
October 22, 1956, in the midst of the Suez expedition, an airplane heading to Tunis
containing Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Boudiaf, Aït-Ahmed Hocine, and Mohamed Khider was
diverted and redirected to land in Algiers. These men, all leaders of the FLN, had participated in
the organization of the All Saints‘ Day massacre. When they arrived in Algiers they were
immediately arrested and transported to France where they remained for the duration of the war.
Though the bombings in the European area of Algiers began the insurrection in the
capital city, the Battle of Algiers did not fully take place until January 7, 1957 when Robert
Lacoste brought the Tenth Paratroop Division into Algiers. The paras as they were known acted
as a police force with essentially a carte blanche which was granted through the Special Powers
law. This law was enacted on March 16, 1956, and grants ―the most extensive powers for
undertaking any exceptional measure dictated by circumstances with a view to the
reestablishment of order, the protection of persons and property and the safeguard of the territory‖
(qtd. in Talbott 83).
Algiers had been terrorized by the FLN and the paras were working for the
―reestablishment of order, the protection of persons and property and the safeguard of the
territory.‖ Thus, they used torture in order to achieve their goal. The terrorism of the FLN led to
the use of torture by the French Army to discover the bombing network and the FLN‘s
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knowledge of the use of torture led them to increase terrorist acts. 6 As the end of the Battle of
Algiers approached the number of terrorist acts decreased greatly in Algiers. The Battle of
Algiers has been publicized greatly in books and movies, such as The Battle of Algiers by Gillo
Pontecorvo, and it is for this reason that this brief history of the war will not discuss this topic in
great detail.
May 1958 proved to be a struggle for the fourth republic, as it was on the verge of a civil
war with the discussion of the treatment of Algeria at the forefront of the debate:
Within less than a week after May 13, then, all the players in the drama had made their
appearance on the stage. The settlers rose against the republic; the army sided with the
settlers; de Gaulle declared himself ready to assume power; Soustelle turned up in
Algiers; a general strike fizzled out; the government wavered between standing firm
against Algiers and giving ground (Talbott 126).
At the end of the May events de Gaulle emerged as the Prime Minister and was put into office on
June 1, 1958. De Gaulle realized that an attempt to keep Algeria French was futile but insisted
that France maintain sovereignty over Algeria (Talbott 137). Although de Gaulle recognized the
futility of keeping Algeria French, Algeria did not receive its independence until 1962.
The end of 1958 signaled an attempt by de Gaulle to work towards peace talks and
Maurice Challe replaced Raoul Salan as commander in Algiers. October 23, 1958 de Gaulle
offered la paix des braves, an attempt for the FLN to lay down their arms and discuss the
possibilities for an end to the conflict, but the FLN did not heed the call for peace talks. This
failure led to the Challe Offensive, an attempt to chase the ALN back to their mountain hideouts

6

As previously mentioned this paper will not focus on the use of terrorism as a means of
psychological warfare because this issue has already been discussed in great detail.
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and due to the offensive, ―guerilla bands did not appear in the countryside in units larger than
company size, or roughly eighty men‖ (Talbott 146).
In August 1959, de Gaulle met with his cabinet in order to discuss a cease-fire with the
FLN, which put an end to the Challe offensive, which may have completely destroyed the FLN
militarily had it been permitted to continue. De Gaulle later mentioned in an address his plans
for the future of Algeria, that of self-determination. Algeria‘s future was to be determined by the
population of Algeria.
In January of 1960, the general over the paras, Jacques Massu, was relieved of his
position in Algiers and was recalled to mainland France. Much of the ultras, the Pieds-noirs in
favor of keeping Algeria French, reacted to the recall of Massu by erecting barricades in the
streets of the European quarter with the slogan ―Vive Massu‖ in an attempt to defend the idea of
a French Algeria. This weeklong event was known as the semaine des barricades. This siege on
Algiers was an attempt to subvert de Gaulle‘s objectives of rendering self-determination to
Algeria. The Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS) was organized in December of the same
year in order to continue what the semaine des barricades had started.
In June of 1960, the leader of wilaya IV, Si Salah, heeded the call of la paix des braves
and was sent to meet with de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace to discuss a cease-fire, to which other
wilayas had agreed. After these talks, de Gaulle implored the Gouvernement Provisoire de la
République Algérienne (GPRA) to conduct peace talks, to which the GPRA agreed and the talks
took place on June 25th in Melun, but ended without any results shortly after the talks had begun.
When Si Salah returned to Algeria to further discuss the cease-fire with the adjacent wilaya he
was captured and killed. These events are known as the L’Affaire Si Salah because it is believed
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that de Gaulle merely agreed to meet with Si Salah in order to further the possibility of peace
talks with the GPRA (Talbott 196).
By the end of 1960, de Gaulle had mentioned an Algerian Algeria in many of his
speeches (Talbott 182). January 8, 1961 de Gaulle decided that it was time for a public vote on a
referendum concerning the ―organization of the public authority in Algeria, while awaiting selfdetermination‖ (qtd. in Talbott 200). The query to which the voters were to vote affirmative or
negative was thus, ―Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people by the President of
the Republic both ‗both concerning the self-determination of the Algerian populations and the
organization of public authority in Algeria before self-determination‘?‖ (qtd. in Talbott 201).
In April of 1961 four generals, Challe, Jouhaud, Salan and Zeller, along with many
colonels disgusted by de Gaulle‘s treatment of Algeria attempted a putsch. The purpose of this
putsch was to keep Algeria French by defeating the ALN in Algeria and removing de Gaulle
from office and starting a new republic. On April 22, 1961 the 1er Régiment étranger des
parachutistes seized Algiers with only one fatality which is claimed to be accidental. The putsch
was unsuccessful and only lasted a few days because of wavering military support. The putsch
had failed and the officers involved were imprisoned. Three of the four generals involved
evaded capture and changed their focus to the OAS and continued to disrupt the possibility of
peace in an Algerian Algeria.
Algerian independence did not come quickly after the putsch had fizzled out. It took over
a year for a cease-fire to take place and Algerian independence did not come until July of 1962.
The time from the putsch to the cease-fire was a very violent period as the OAS and FLN were
committing acts of terrorism against each other. With each OAS terrorist act the following FLN
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act in response was more violent and then the OAS responded more violently. ―French rule in
Algeria ended as violently as it began‖ (Talbott 20).
The peace talks that had failed in 1960 at Melun were continued in Evian-les-Bains
where an agreement was made on March 18, 1962 and a cease-fire followed the next day. On
April 8, 1962 a referendum was held in France to vote on the Evian Accords, the referendum
passed and on July 1, 1962 a similar referendum was held in Algeria where there was an
overwhelming approval. July 3, 1962, de Gaulle declared Algeria independent and Algeria
officially became independent on July 5, 1962, 132 years after the initial conquest.
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5. PROPAGANDA FOR A FRENCH ALGERIA
Propaganda during the Algerian war existed on both sides in an effort to influence people‘s
opinions and beliefs. The French propaganda urged the French (in métropole), Pieds noirs (the
French Algerians) and native Algerians towards maintaining a French Algeria.7 This chapter
will be divided into 3 sections and will discuss the diffusion of French propaganda and the
different propaganda messages directed towards the French and the Algerians.
Diffusion of French Propaganda
The most popular media of propaganda during the Algerian war were leaflets and posters. These
posters were most frequently placed in central spaces where the masses could easily see them,
such as busy street corners and on propaganda boards. Figure 2, Aux urnes citoyens, illustrates
small posters pasted to the wall in the Casbah on the corner of the school urging the population
to vote for a referendum on self-determination. Figure 2, Poster Board, illustrates a propaganda
board by the French directed towards the native population. The message there is directing them
essentially to choose between good and bad, where the French represent good, ―La France veut
ton bonheur‖.

7

Propaganda by the OAS fits into this category but I have chosen to omit this because the OAS
was not necessarily a cohesive unit. Susini, the founding member of the OAS, wrote that
―everyone that had access to a mimeograph machine regarded himself as an OAS propagandist‖
(qtd. in Talbott 218), and Pierre Sergent, who commanded the metropolitan OAS, said of the
members of the OAS, ―Each believes in his truth, in his solution that he considers unique. Each
jealousy protects his boutique and his activists like so many treasures‖ (qtd. in Talbott 219).
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Figure 2
Figure 3

Leaflets were often distributed by dropping them from helicopters. The following story
comes from Ted Morgan‘s memoire as a propaganda officer in the French Army, entitled My
Battle of Algiers, in which he describes how the French military distributed its leaflets:
On Sunday, January 27 [1957], the day before the strike, Brissac awakened me out of a
sound sleep at 8 AM and told me to come to the office at once. The first issue of our
paper had been printed and was in the kiosques. He had a stack of them in the office and
wanted me to take them over the Casbah in a chopper and drop them in the hope that the
banner headline, ‗Tous à l‘école,‘ would make an impression.
The chopper was waiting on the parade ground of a barracks above the Casbah,
and I got in with my papers. ‗A little reading material for the bougnouls‘ (an offensive
word for Arabs), the pilot said. We hovered over the Casbah, and the people below in the
narrow alleys scattered. I started throwing the papers out, but a gust of wind came up and
most of them blew out to sea. I watched them fly off, the pages flapping like pelican
wings.
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I went back to the office and found Brissac composing a leaflet that said: ‗The
Algerian Communist Party says no to the strike. It is useless, since the United Nations
will demand Algerian independence. It is unjust because it will starve the people. The
FLN is leading the Algerian people astray.‘
‗Just a little disinformation,‘ he said. ―We‘ll get these printed up and they‘ll be
all over the city this afternoon.‘
… At dawn on January 28, a chopper dropped another set of Brissac‘s flyers over
the Casbah: ‗The FLN demands the closing of stores. The FLN wants to starve the
inhabitants of Algiers. Have faith in the forces of order. (145-6)

Officers such as Ted Morgan would also go from village to village sharing propaganda
messages directed towards maintaining a French Algeria. In the following image, two officers
show a poster to an Algerian village encouraging them to talk or they become the accomplices of
the FLN‘s crimes.

Figure 4
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Propaganda towards the French

Figure 5

Source: White, French
Context: The war is creating a divide in France
Time: 1957
Audience: French
Medium: Poster
Subject: Gain support for keeping Algeria French
Mission: Quell the rebellion to keep Algeria French
Translation: ―No more French Algeria…no more France. Union for the salvation and renewal of
French Algeria‖

In April of 1956 Jacques Soustelle, former Governor-General of Algeria, and Georges
Bidault, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, created the Union pour le Salut et le renouveau de
l’Algérie française (USRAF). The purpose of the USRAF was to help maintain French support
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for a French Algeria. On September 16, 1959, the USRAF was betrayed by de Gaulle when he
announced his intentions to grant self-determination to the Algerians and an Algerian Algeria.
Some of the supporters of the USRAF became members of the OAS.
The grenade in the middle of Algeria is in the process of exploding and as it does so it is
tearing apart France and Algeria. One large side effect of losing Algeria for France would be the
reintegration of the Pieds Noirs into la métropole. It is estimated that around one million of
these Pieds Noirs fled in mass exodus to France with only what they could carry in their
suitcases (Meredith 74). Losing Algeria was also not an option for the Harkis because they had
become traitors to their country by fighting alongside the French and would surely lose their
lives.
Algeria is also being shown as being torn apart by the war. The USRAF is attempting to
show that if Algeria were to gain its independence it would fall apart politically and
economically. The leaders of the FLN in the minds of the French were a bunch of hooligans and
criminals and without the support of France the country would fall into a state of extreme
poverty.
A loss to Algeria would demonstrate the lack of ability of the French Army to conduct a
military operation effectively. France here is shown as in the process of being torn apart, yet the
area known as Alsace-Lorraine has already been separated from mainland France. This part of
France has changed hands multiple times between France and Germany. The most recent change
of hands was at the end of World War II when Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. This
poster is implying that if France were to lose Algeria the loss of Alsace-Lorraine would come
quickly.
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Figure 6

Source: White, French
Context: De Gaulle in power
Time: 1958
Audience: French and Algerians
Medium: Poster
Subject: Demonstrate that everyone in France and Algeria are French
Mission: Gain popular support against the rebellion
Translation: ―55 million French in France‖

The text of this document is in the form of the Cross of Lorraine, which was originally
the symbol of Joan of Arc because she came from that region. From the Franco-Prussian war
until the end of 1918 Alsace-Lorraine was in the hands of the Germans so the Cross of Lorraine
became a symbol of regaining territory that had been lost. This was similar during World War II
when Alsace-Lorraine was once again lost to the Germans; the Free French Forces used this as
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their symbol because it came to represent patriotism. De Gaulle used the Cross of Lorraine as
his symbol, representing patriotism and nationalism.
The two cities mentioned, Dunkerque and Tamanrasset, are the furthest cities north and
south; Dunkerque is the northern most city in France while Tamanrasset is the southern most city
in Algeria. The vertical bar of the cross connects its ends at these two cities implying, through
the text, that everything in between is France.
The base of the cross is firmly planted deep within Algeria, representing the essential
nature of Algeria to France. Without the base the entire cross would collapse. This could be in
reference to the newly discovered oil in the Saharan desert in southern Algeria. With this oil,
France would become a very wealthy country, but losing Algeria would result in a loss of control
of the oil fields.
The background of the poster shows the outlines of the French kingdom, including
mainland France, Corsica and Algeria. Behind this, images of French people are gathered
together in unity, carrying French flags. The top of the image contains native French but towards
the bottom, closer to Algeria, the individuals are of Arabic descent. Nevertheless, the message is
that all of these individuals from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset are French.
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Propaganda towards the Algerians
Propaganda towards the Algerians for a French Algeria takes several different forms including
documents directly aimed at the FLN, whereas others focus on the general population. Some
focus on the defection of troops while others focus on whistle blowing. While the propaganda
takes upon itself several forms, the French Army is at the head of this propaganda effort.

Figure 7

Source: Grey
Context: The FLN leaders left for Switzerland to set up a bank account for the FLN
Time: ca. 1956
Audience: Muslim Algerians and those involved in the FLN
Medium: Leaflet/Poster
Subject: Deter the general population from supporting the FLN
Mission: Eliminate money flow to the FLN
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Translation: ―The murderous Fellagha are stealing your savings. Abroad the leaders of the
rebellion are playing with your money‖

The Fellagha is an Arabic word that literally means bandit. The armed militants of the
anti-colonial movement in North Africa were commonly referred to as the Fellaghas. The top
right of the image shows an Algerian shop owner opening his cash box and handing over some
of his earnings to the Fellagha; ―residents of the Casbah who did not work with the FLN were
intimidated into giving money and keeping quiet…the flow of money into the treasury became a
fairly accurate gauge of the FLN‘s control of the population‖ (Talbott 80).
The shop owner is shown being forced to hand over the money by two Fellaghas with a
crescent and moon arm band on their right arms. The Fellagha on the left is holding the
traditional weapon of the Algerian War, the MAT .49. The money appears to be flowing from
the top right where the shop owner is to the lower left where the leaders are portrayed drinking
and smoking around a table in laughter; the FLN leaders are shown as men without faith or law
according to Muslim rule. This diagonal line created by the money appears to be flowing into
the glasses and hands of the irresponsible leaders. The curled edges of the money make it appear
as if the money is in motion in a constant state of moving from the people‘s hands to the tables of
the FLN.
The text in the top left corner is in French, whereas, on the bottom left corner the same
text is written in Arabic, so as to aim the propaganda at all possible audiences. The source of
this propaganda can be seen as grey in that the source from which the propaganda emanates may
be from the French government, but the accuracy of the information is questionable.
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This propaganda document can be seen as roughly following the constructive poster
where ―The surface is arranged and formed into geometrically proportioned parts, the lettering is
condensed and included in the space as an element of equal importance to the image, the drawing
is stylized and strictly divided both vertically and horizontally, and only two colors are used‖
(Müller-Brockmann 157). This is shown in the following rendering of the image (figure 4).
There is a geometrical proportioning of the image where the lettering is concise and of equal
importance to the image, while only using two colors.

Figure 8
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Figure 9

Source: White, French Army
Context: The FLN are harassing the innocent Algerians
Time: ca. 1955
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Who will save you
Mission: Rally support against the FLN
Translation: ―Who will deliver you from these venomous scorpions?‖

This leaflet, distributed by the French Army, is an attempt to influence those who are not
actively participating in the rebellion to come to the French side and support the army. This
leaflet is asking the simple question, ―Who will save you?‖ The French army here is boasting
their military prowess by declaring that they can eliminate the threat, as if they are a superhero
and the FLN is the villain.
Fellah in Arabic refers to a peasant or farmer, thus, the innocent Algerian peasant is being
threatened by venomous scorpions. Scorpions symbolize danger, pain and treachery because
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they often strike without any warning, because of this the FLN are described as venomous
scorpions. Each of the four scorpions is wearing a hat stating some of their crimes: vol, crime,
destruction, viol (theft, crime, destruction, rape).
The border of the document forms a sort of barricade, similar to those that were erected
along the borders with Morocco and Tunisia. This barricade along with the four scorpions in
each corner is restricting the Fellah so as to appear that there is no escape except through the help
of the French Army.
This text is not only written in French, but in Arabic as well so that all of the uneducated
Algerian Fellah can understand the message. The most prominent element of this leaflet is the
word qui (who) which is in essence a cry for help.
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Figure 10

Source: White, French
Context: Beginning of the war
Time: ca. 1955
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Under the French flag we are all French
Mission: Unify Algeria under the French flag
Translation: ―One heart, one flag, we are all French in French Algeria‖

This leaflet shows an Algerian and a Frenchman holding hands, and both are wearing the
same attire except for the turban which sets the Algerian apart from the Frenchman. This leaflet
is implying that the only difference between French from métropole and a French Algerian is
their religion and the turban on their head. The Algerian, not the European is holding the
drapeau tricolore, which signifies that the Algerian is just as French as the Frenchman while
under the drapeua tricolore.
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Figure 11

Source: White, French Army
Context: Beginning of the war
Time: ca. 1955
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Encourage whistle blowers
Mission: Eliminate the revolution before it has a chance to come into full swing
Translation: ―Let‘s talk in order to protect our lives‖

This leaflet is directed to the native Algerians in an attempt to get them to inform the
French army of the rebel‘s intentions and plans. The text of the leaflet implies that if the
rebellion is quelled, peace will be restored and the taking of lives in combat will not be necessary.
This document relies heavily on imagery rather than text. The Muslim informants appear
to be more than happy to point out the rebels, while the French Foreign Legion officer appears to
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be angry, with the edge of the eyebrow raised, as he looks and perceives the rebels. The rebels in
the background almost appear as zombies in the way that they are walking, lifeless and hunched
over. The rebels are wearing arm bands on their left arms displaying the crescent and moon,
which since the Ottoman Empire represents the Muslim faith and is used to represent the FLN
rebels. The children in the image are pointing at the rebels as well; this is in reference to the idea
that children are less likely to keep secrets and if the adults do not inform the French, the
children will.
The text in French is written in bold and uses the imperative, which is used to give
commands or suggestions. Here, the imperative is used as an encouraging suggestion. The same
text is written in Arabic at the top of the image. The use of both French and Arabic in this leaflet
is so that the message will be understood by everyone.
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Figure 12

Source: White, French Army
Context: Rebel Interrogations and torture
Time: ca. 1956
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Become an informant
Mission: Quell the rebellion
Translation: ―Everyone is talking and the rebel is giving up‖

The text of this leaflet can be seen as an ―if then‖ statement, if everyone talks then the
rebels will have no other choice than to give up. At the same time it is a declarative statement
stating that everyone is talking and the rebels are giving up. The use of the text as a declarative
statement may ring in the ears of rebels who are unsure about what they are doing and because
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they are ill-informed they will give up because they perceive that others are giving up as well.
The text is written in both Arabic and French to reach all of the rebels, educated and uneducated.
The two most prominent words of this leaflet are parle and abandonne. The use of these
two words along with the image illustrates the link between talking and the rebels abandoning
their ways. This leaflet is an attempt to encourage the innocent Algerians who may know some
information to come forward in order to end the violence and destruction. It is propagating the
same ideals as the leaflet stating Parlons pour défendre notre vie (figure 11).
The FLN rebel has just laid down his weapon of war and is approaching the viewer with
his hands raised above his head in submission. On his left arm is the crescent and moon
armband typically worn by the FLN soldiers. The armband is facing the viewer of the
propaganda in order to identify the individual. Visually this armband is intriguing because if the
rebel were to put his hands down, the crescent and moon would be on the inside of his arm. The
rebel is shown coming from the barren wasteland behind him. The image is very rigid yet at the
same time it is trying to show movement as the rebel is stepping forward and dropping his gun.
The rifle that is being dropped by the rebel is an archaic single shot Gras Rifle which was used in
the late 19th century. The FLN would use any weapons that they could get their hands on
including American and German rifles from World War I. Illustrating the archaic weapon
demonstrates that the rebels are not well equipped against the newer weapons of the French.
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Figure 13

Source: White, French Army
Context: The war
Time: ca. 1956
Audience: Algerian Muslims
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Recruit Muslims to join the French Army
Mission: Increase military forces in Algeria
Translation: ―Muslim youth, why not you? Join the metropolitan troops. For all information
regarding enlistment go to the Gendarmeries, Town Halls, Military Posts and the Special
Administration Section. Fully French.‖

This propaganda leaflet is aimed towards the native Algerian population with an
emphasis on encouraging them to join the French military. The leaflets asks the simple question
―Why not you?‖ and implies that in order to become fully French one must join the ranks of the
military and defend France. The source of this propaganda is clear; it originates from the 5e
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bureau as is shown by the acronym at the bottom of the leaflet, PsyCAO, which stands for the
psychological division of the Corps d‘Armée d‘Oran (Descombin 31).
The Algerians were encouraged to enlist in the French Army in order to help bring peace
to the country. The Section Administrative Spécialisée, SAS, created in 1955 was an attempt to
place French influence on the Muslim population in rural areas. The SAS in conjunction with
providing French influence was also responsible for recruiting and training the Harkis. The term
Harki is an adjective of the Arabic word harka meaning movement and is most commonly
referred to as Muslim Algerians serving in the French army during the war.
The image on the right of the leaflet shows a native Algerian in his traditional garb
wearing a turban transforming into a member of the French military with a calot. It appears as if
he is moving forward and in essence is progressing towards becoming more French, yet it is
showing the dual nature of the role, you can still be a Muslim and participate in the French Army.
The coat encompasses both of them showing this dual nature.
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Figure 14

Source: White, French Army
Context: The FLN leaders were caught on an airplane heading to Tunis
Time: November 1956
Audience: Fellagha
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: The leaders of the rebellion have been captured and the continuation of fighting is futile
Mission: Termination of the rebellion
Translation: Middle document: ―A new Algeria is going to be born. The rebellion is condemned
and Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf and the others have recognized it. The rebellion has lost the day.
Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf and the others have revealed your organization‘s secrets and from
now on we will now move to strike on it. Fellagha cease-fire, it is in your best interests.
Abandon the errors of your ways. Get rid of your criminal leaders and respond to the call of
President Mollet and Resident Minister Lacoste. Adjoul Adjoul, the rebel leader of the Aurès
has understood it and has turned himself in. Take back your place among us before it is too late,
come work with us in order to realize our communal aspiration in a new prosperous and happy
Algeria.‖ Right document: ―If you don‘t believe it, look at them, they are in jail‖
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October 21 1956, the leaders of the FLN in Algiers were on their way to Tunis to meet
with the Tunisian government in order to form a North African union. The leaders included
Ahmed Ben Bell, Aït-Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Lacheraf.
On their way to Tunis, the French government intercepted the plane and redirected it towards
Algiers. The second the FLN leaders stepped off the plane they were arrested. This was a big
day for the French because of the capture of the FLN leaders, yet they had not captured the
militants and the FLN leaders became martyrs of the revolution.
The French believed that through the capture of these men they had cut off the head of
the revolution and that the FLN had lost the rebellion. This document was released as a result
calling for a cease-fire declaring that it is in their best interest to put down their arms. The front
of the document with the images of the FLN leaders in prison is used as a form of proof that they
had been captured; written in large font above the pictures are the words, ―If you don‘t
believe…look at them.‖
The reverse side of the leaflet is very text heavy, whereas the most important elements of
the front are the two images of the leaders. The use of bolding and large type font is used to
mark the essential elements of the document. The eye is naturally drawn to the largest font in the
middle with a declaration for a CESSEZ-LE-FEU. The following three lines begin with words
written in bold: abandonnez, débarrassez-vous, répondez. These three words follow a logical
progression towards becoming reintegrated into French society in order to build a new and
prosperous Algeria. This document was written both in French and in Arabic, so as to
demonstrate to all that the rebellion had lost.
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Figure 15

Source: White, French Army
Context: The FLN is using its members to cross the border into Morocco or Tunisia in order to
smuggle guns into the country to arm the FLN/ALN
Time: ca. 1956
Audience: Algerians, Tunisians, FLN
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Preventing gunrunning from Tunisia and Morocco
Mission: Stop the flow of guns to the FLN/ALN
Translation: ―Do you still want to experiment with the barricade? This is what you get from
messing with it…DEATH‖

Only months after the All Saints‘ Day massacre in 1954, which marked the beginning of
the Algerian war, did gunrunners begin crossing the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Both
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Tunisia and Morocco had gained their independence from France and were willing to aid Algeria
in its struggle. Barricades were constructed along the borders in order to inhibit the illegal
trafficking of guns. On February 8, 1958, the French Air Force bombed Sidi Sakiet Youssef, a
Tunisian village believed to be aiding end embedding the FLN, in order to inhibit the gunrunning
and eliminate the FLN guerillas that were supposedly harbored there.
This leaflet attempts to deter current and prospective gunrunners by illustrating the results
of an attempt to cross the barricade, the end result being death. The image on the lower left hand
side is disturbing, showing the man‘s leg cut off and caught in the wire hanging above his body.
This propaganda leaflet is used as a scare tactic following a logical pattern, if you do x you will
get y, as is shown through the use of the arrows.
The typeface is handwritten with a mixture of words in upper and lower cases and uses
bolding as a form of emphasis. The keywords in this leaflet are written in all-caps: veux-tu,
barrage, tu gagnes, la mort. The most prominent word in this leaflet is LA MORT,
emphasizing the end result.
This document uses the colloquial pronoun, tu, instead of the formal pronoun, vous. Tu is
generally used in familiar situations such as with friends and family. Thus, the use of tu is an
attempt to personalize this advice to them, as if a concerned friend is warning them of the results.
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Figure 16

Source: Grey
Context: Competition between the FLN and the MNA for control of the revolution
Time: ca. 1956
Audience: Algerian natives
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Deter the general population from supporting the FLN
Mission: Eliminate the FLN and the revolutionary movement
Translation: ―The jackals are killing each other‖

The term jackal is a pejorative term referring to a cruel and bloodthirsty person. The jackal also
represents ―lust, greed, cruelty and sensuality, in short, all violent feelings and emotions‖
(Chevalier 548). The French here are not only comparing the FLN to savage animals but to a
bloodthirsty group who will kill whomever they want or need. ―In wartime, the enemy is often
symbolized as subhuman or animal-like to soften the killing process linguistically‖ (Jowett 295).
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This leaflet originates from the French and is attempting to show the disorganization of
the FLN and their inability to unite as a single cohesive group; they act as jackals, as is shown in
the image in the upper left. The source of this propaganda leaflet can be seen as grey because the
source is clear, the French, but the message may not be completely accurate.
The French sat back and watched the rivalry between the FLN and the MNA in hopes
that they would destroy each other and in so doing, kill the revolution. By the end of 1956, the
MNA had joined forces with their enemies, the FLN, in order to bring order to the revolution
(Vallaud 131).
The leaflet can be divided into three separate parts, the FLN, the jackals and the owl, but
in essence the jackals in the upper left are portrayed as almost being a reflection of the FLN. The
owl appears to be watching over the conflict while wearing a fez cap. The fez cap is most
popularly worn in Morocco and Tunisia, and thus the owl can be representative of the FLN‘s
supporters. The owl is shown by the French as representing the Tunisians and Moroccans sitting
around watching what is happening.
The text is handwritten in red, the same red that is pouring from the MNA‘s dead body,
as if it is written in blood. The typeface is not merely informing the reader that the Jackals are
eating each other, but it is showing the bloodshed.
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Figure 17

Source: White, French
Context: Paix des braves
Time: 1958
Audience: FLN
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Defection of enemy troops
Mission: Keep Algeria French
Translation: ―Come shape a more French Algeria. This leaflet serves as a travel pass‖

There were many leaflets and documents during the war similar to this one that served as
a travel pass, or a white flag in the traditional sense. In 1958 de Gaulle, as Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense, offered the paix des braves which was intended as a means for the FLN to
come talk with the French without being attacked. If a member of the FLN were to approach the
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military with one of these they were able to become reintegrated into French society without
being harmed. This is a very simple leaflet containing minimal amounts of text and a single
image of de Gaulle. The use of de Gaulle in this leaflet is to emphasize nationalistic ideals,
―l‘homme du passé se déclare ainsi guide du futur‖ (Gervereau, La propagande 142).
Face to face contact in propaganda is shown to be very effective in the use of persuading
opinions and beliefs (Jowett 292). But, during the Algerian war it was almost impossible for the
Algerians to physically see de Gaulle. Thus, the use of de Gaulle‘s face on propaganda leaflets
was an opportunity for the rebels to have some semblance of face to face contact in an attempt to
persuade the rebel‘s views.
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Figure 18

Source: White, French
Context: Paix des Braves
Time: 1958
Audience: FLN
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Defection of FLN troops
Mission: Keep Algeria French
Translation: ―De Gaulle is peace. This document is a travel pass‖

This is another document that served as a travel document, or a white flag. The back side
of the document, the left image, is showing an FLN militant carrying this very document along
the barricades to a French patrolman. The use of the crescent and moon armband informs the
viewer that this individual is part of the revolutionary forces. The FLN militant is approaching
the French soldier with his archaic M1 Garand behind him. The French soldier is walking
towards him with his hand outstretched reaching for the document rather than with his gun
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pointing at the FLN militant. There is a direct diagonal line from the hand of the FLN to the
outstretched arm of the French soldier. This is an attempt to demonstrate the willingness of the
French to accept the defection of FLN troops.
The image of de Gaulle is the traditional image, representing peace and nationalistic
ideals. This depiction of de Gaulle is almost a mirror image of figure 17. De Gaulle desires to
bring peace and is willing to put his image on the line in order to achieve this goal.
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Figure 19

Source: White, French Army
Context: La paix des braves, the Bellouni affair
Time: October 1958
Audience: Outlaw Rebels
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: The outlaws can be reintegrated into French society before it becomes too late
Mission: Cause defection among the rebels
Translation: ―To the outlaws who are in the mountains! General Salan has officially decided to
engage in combat against those who refuse the pardon granted by himself and General de Gaulle.
The generous and strong France will forgive those who come back into its fold but it will abolish
those traitors who oppress and terrorize the French population. Bellounis rallied towards France
and she forgave him! Bellounis then betrayed her and then she defeated Bellounis! May the
death of Bellounis serve as a warning to those who have been led astray by their leaders who
have not yet reintegrated into the French community! Soon it will be too late‖
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This document is addressed to the hors-la-loi, or outlaws, ―Rebelling against their own
government put these citizens hors la loi. They were outlaws, persons beyond the law yet at the
same time subject to it‖ (Talbott 51). This leaflet makes reference to the Bellouni affair;
Mohammed Bellouni was an Algerian nationalist, a member of the MTLD and a commander
over militants of the MNA in Kabylie. After the events of November 1, 1954, he worked with the
French Army against the FLN. In 1957, Bellouni stated, ―L‘Algérie doit dans tous les cas rester
liée à la France‖ (Stora, Les mots 21). Thus, Bellouni had rallied towards France but then in
1958 he had some disagreements with the French and was then killed on July 14 1958.
This leaflet uses a specific example in order to demonstrate the validity of the
propagandist‘s message. When the propagandist is referring to the Bellouni affair he is using
logic through ―if then‖ statements; if you comply then you will be forgiven but if you do not
comply then you will be defeated.
Pardon is used three separate times while referring to the same thing. Each time the
word pardon is used it is written in all-caps, emphasizing the willingness of the French to forgive
those who have gone against them. The use of all-caps in this document is emphasizing
important elements of the propaganda. The use of bolding is also to make that element of the
document pop out to the readers. This document is not merely stating that the French are
allowing the rebels to come back; that statement was made when de Gaulle announced the paix
des braves, so this document is stating the validity of the paix des braves and sustaining it.
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Figure 20

Source: White, French Army
Context: The pacification of Algeria
Time: ca. 1959
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Poster
Subject: To pacify and unite Algeria
Mission: To quell the rebellion and bring peace to France and Algeria
Artist: M. Fontaine
Translation: ―The French Army in Algeria: To establish peace and to unite‖

This poster is showing the French military goals for Algeria, pacification and unification.
As previously stated, pacification is merely a ―euphemism [as] old as the conquest of Algeria for
the application of military force‖ (Talbott 61). Thus, through military force the French Army
will amalgamate the divide between France and Algeria.
57

The word pacifier is defined here as the use of arms to quell the rebellion, as is shown by
the image of a member of the French military. With the image next to the word, the word
becomes associated with that image. The same can be seen with the word unir which is defined
as a coming together of ideas as shown by the handshake. The use of showing an image
associated with a word is a common vocabulary learning technique and is defined as binding;
―Binding is the term I propose to describe the cognitive and affective mental process of linking a
meaning to a form. The concept of binding is what language teachers refer to when they insist
that a new word ultimately be associated directly with its meaning and not with a translation‖
(Terrell 214).
The image in the background is a rough outline of northern Algeria bordered by Tunisia
and Morocco. The foreground displays a handshake between a French and an Algerian, the hand
on the left is paler, and thus representing the French, whereas, the hand on the right is darker,
thus representing the Algerians. The differentiation between the two nationalities can also be
seen by the sleeve; the man on the left is wearing a military uniform, whereas, the man on the
right is wearing a thobe.
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Figure 21

Source: White, French
Context: Leaders of the Wilaya and the GPRA are in Tunisia
Time: ca. 1958
Audience: Algerian militants
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Discourage the combatants from supporting of the GPRA
Mission: Eliminating the military threat of the revolution
Translation: ―Algeria: Come over here where the fighting is going on. Tunisia: Sorry, I am too
busy‖

The Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, GPRA, was formed in
September of 1958 in Egypt by members of the FLN as a diplomatic arm of the already existing
FLN. As depicted in this leaflet, the leaders of the GPRA were in Tunisia enjoying themselves
while the combatants in Algeria were risking their lives fighting and living in caves for the
revolution.
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This leaflet uses the same colors as the GPRA and post-independence flag of Algeria,
green, white and red; the left side being green and the right side white. The dotted line between
the two sides can be seen as the barricades that separate these two individuals and the countries,
which in essence demonstrates the dichotomy between the leaders of the revolution and the
combatants. The leader of the GPRA is shown lounging on a beach chair under an umbrella
drinking champagne while the soldier is stuck living in a cave and making a fire in order to
survive.
Visually, the two most prominent words are Algérie and Tunisie, the font size of the
dialogue in the bubbles is much smaller. Using a smaller font size in the dialogue bubbles shows
that the message contained therein are not as important as the imagery.
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Figure 22

Source: White, French
Context: De Gaulle‘s Speech on self-determination
Time: 1960
Audience: Algerians
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: We are all French
Mission: Unify Algeria and France under the same flag
Translation: ―One heart, one flag, 53 million French‖

The difference between this leaflet and the other one declaring the same slogan is that the
previous leaflet focuses on the French flag rather than Charles de Gaulle. After 1958 almost all
French propaganda during the war involved imagery relating to de Gaulle. This image uses the
Cross of Lorraine along with the V-sign to emphasize the nationalistic and patriotic symbolism
associated with de Gaulle.
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The context of this leaflet is significant; de Gaulle had given his speech on selfdetermination on 16 September 1959 and desired talks with the FLN. Although De Gaulle had
issued his television address on self-determination, he had not quite given up on completely
losing control over Algeria; he had suggested such ideas as a dual partnership where France
would still play a role, while Algeria would rule itself. This leaflet is an attempt to encourage the
population to continue to work with the French and avoid secession claiming that ―we are all
French.‖ The purpose of this leaflet is to propagate the idea that de Gaulle has understood the
Algerian‘s plights and is willing to work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
This leaflet uses prominent landmarks in Algeria and France instead of individuals. The
idea of communities working together has become more important than individuals working
together. The edifice representing Algeria is a mosque, which is an important and defining
element for the Muslims of Algeria. The edifice representing France is the classic icon of the
Eiffel Tower with a French flag flying. The trees next to the edifices match the climate of each
area and are used to show the diversity of France, while the text states ―one heart‖ and ―one flag‖,
demonstrating that although there are some cultural differences ―we are all French‖.
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6. PROPAGANDA FOR AN ALGERIAN ALGERIA
Propaganda for an independent Algeria began solely with the FLN and Algerians, but towards
the end of the war propaganda began coming from both sides in an effort to cede Algeria its
independence. With de Gaulle in power and through his politics of self-determination,
propaganda from the French would no longer focus on keeping Algeria French, but would focus
on de Gaulle‘s policy of self-determination. ―Sous de Gaulle, l‘Algérie disparaît dans la
propagande. Elle devient un prétexte des affiches‖ (Gervereau, La France 180).
Throughout the war, the Algerians were fighting for their independence; this fight did not
only exist through the use of arms, but through the use of propaganda as well. Most members of
the FLN participated in propaganda, Yacef Saadi, an FLN leader during the Battle of Algiers,
stated, ―le F.L.N. n‘a jamais cessé d‘être lié au peuple par le comité politique: propagande
chuchotée ou écrite, collecte de fonds, sélection des candidats pour l‘action armée, police F.L.N.,
etc…‖ (34).
This chapter will be divided into three parts, the diffusion of propaganda, FLN
propaganda and French propaganda towards an Algerian Algeria.

63

Diffusion of Propaganda for an Algerian Algeria
The diffusion of French propaganda for an Algerian Algeria was very similar to the diffusion of
propaganda for maintaining a French Algeria. Posters and leaflets were still used in the same
fashion. The diffusion of Algerian propaganda differs greatly from the French because if they
were to put up posters, the French government would have taken them down and tortured
individuals to determine who had placed and created the posters. Due to this, the
counterpropaganda by the Algerians was mostly transmitted underground, by hand or by word of
mouth, though there are instances where it was also painted on walls or on streets.

Figure 23

Figure 24
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Propaganda towards the Algerians

Figure 25

Source: White, FLN
Context: Algerians enrolled in the French Army are fighting against the revolution
Time: ca. 1959
Audience: Algerians enrolled in the French Army
Medium: Leaflet
Subject: Defection of the Harkis from the French Army
Mission: Increase the ALN‘s military force
Translation: ―Harkis! Algerians! Enrolled in the French army…The French army and the
European settlers have fired on unarmed Muslim crowds…They have assassinated women,
children, and the elderly. Your blood has been spilt…Will you do nothing before these heinous
crimes? Don‘t be accomplices to these criminals! Algerian independence is guaranteed and nigh.
Join the ranks of the A.L.N. there is still time.‖
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This leaflet is directed to the Harkis but they are not only addressed as Harkis, but as
Algerians, implying their role as an Algerian in the struggle for their independence. It is in
essence asking the simple question ―what side are you on, the winning or the losing?‖ declaring
that their independence is guaranteed and near at hand.
This leaflet is text heavy, but still contains a poignant image of the dead bodies of
Muslim women, elderly and children, which have been assassinated by the French Army at Sétif
in May of 1945. This massacre at Sétif was a point de départ that led the rebellion to new
extremes; the death toll at Sétif is estimated at 20,000 (Stora Les mots, 109). The image used
here was in fact censured by the French government during the Algerian war (Gervereau, La
France 226).
The text plays upon the emotions of the audience as it states that the French have
assassinated unarmed civilians and then asks the question, ―Allez-vous rester les bras croisés
devant ces crimes odieux?‖ Propaganda ―uses language that tends to deify a cause and satanize
opponents‖ (Jowett 294) as is shown in this leaflet. Though this propaganda is an appeal to
emotions it also uses some logic implicating that because the French Army has assassinated
unarmed civilians and the Harkis did nothing to stop the acts they are accomplices as well. The
FLN is stating that the Harkis are criminals, but there is still time to rejoin the ALN and right
their wrongs.
The use of all-caps in this leaflet is used as an attempt to put an emphasis on certain
aspects of the message; to further put an emphasis on certain words punctuation and underlining
is used as well. There are three instances where an exclamation mark is used and two of those
instances are in the first line while addressing the recipients of the message, and the third time is
declaring to the Harkis that they should not be accomplices to the French Army. The use of
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underlining is used four times, putting an emphasis on: l’armée, les complices, proche, il est
encore temps.
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Propaganda towards the French

Figure 26

Source: Gray, the French Communist Party
Context: Legislative elections a little over a year after the beginning of the war
Time: January 1956
Audience: The French population
Medium: Poster
Subject: To remind the general population that during legislative elections the French voted for
peace in Algeria
Mission: Move the government to action to bring peace to Algeria
Translation: ―12 million French have voted on January 2nd for peace in Algeria. Their will must
be respected‖

This poster was released just a day after legislative elections on January 2nd 1956, where
more than 12 million French voted for peace in Algeria (Vallaud 123). Visually this is an
interesting poster because the propagandist is recalling a memory through images, as if it is
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saying ―remember what you have said, now act on it‖. This source of this document is very clear,
the Communist Party, it is even stated at the bottom of the poster but the red background is a
more visually striking symbol of the communists.
The hand coming from the upper left hand corner is putting a voting ballot into a ballot
box, but on the front of the ballot box is a rich image of a French woman and an Algerian woman.
The communists are calling the French hypocrites through this poster; the French woman in this
image is wearing a bonnet rouge, which was a red cap worn by the supporters of the revolution,
showing that they were once the repressed but the roles have changed. The Communist party is
stating that the French should allow the Algerians to be free, just as they themselves overcame
repression and received their independence 167 years earlier. The French Communist Party may
have also had ulterior motives; they wanted France to pull out of Algeria so that they could
install a communist government. ―Interpreters of la guerre révolutionaire insisted that the
Algerian revolution played into the hands of international communism. They held, moreover,
that the rebellion was plotted, channeled, controlled to a very high degree‖ (Kelly 164).
The angle at which the French woman is standing is showing here ceding her place to the
Algerian woman who appears to be moving to the front of the image; the French woman‘s hand
is on the shoulder of the Algerian woman, almost as if she is welcoming her to her new place in
the world. The two women are also shaking hands, which is seen as a peaceful unification of the
two countries.
This poster is as rich textually as it is visually; the most prominent words are explaining
what had happened on the specified date, ―12 million French‖, ―for‖, ―Peace in Algeria‖. The
coloring of the font is also visually striking because at first glance a reader may only see, ―12
millions de Français pour la paix en Algérie‖. The entire text is written in all-caps, except for ―de‖
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which is traditionally not capitalized, which is a propaganda technique used to put an emphasis
on the issue.
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Figure 27

Source: Gray, French Communist Party
Context: National Assembly elections (November 1958)
Time: October 1958
Audience: French and Algerians
Medium: Poster
Subject: Gain support during the elections
Mission: Restore peace and friendship between Algeria and France
Translation: ―The French Communist Party: Bargaining for peace and friendship between France
and Algeria‖

The two children, the future of France and Algeria, are holding a dove symbolizing hope
and peace between these two countries for generations to come. The dove is not only
symbolizing peace between these countries but a faithful joining of them in friendship,
―Christian tradition made the [dove] the symbol of faithful marriage‖ (Chevalier 307). This
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symbolism of faithful marriage would strike true in the hearts of the fervent Catholic French
population.
The Muslim woman and child are dominating the image and the French woman and child
almost seem to be relinquishing their position and moving over for the installation of the Muslim;
the French woman‘s right hand is in an open gesture ushering the Algerian woman and child to
their place in society. This is very similar to the poster by the Communist Party after the
legislative elections on January 2, 1956.
The use of blue as the background color for this poster is to signify prosperity. Blue can
also signify here happiness and optimism, as if blue skies are in the future along with peace and
friendship between France and Algeria. The juxtaposition of white on blue is used to further
emphasize the idea of peace. The text on this poster is simple and the larger font size draws the
eye naturally to paix and l’amitié. The text on the bottom right corner simply states the address
of the Communist Party and the month and year in which this poster was published.
The Communist Party was not in favor of the war and desired a diplomatic conclusion.
Most of the Communist propaganda during the Algerian war focuses on a peaceful resolution to
the conflict. With the uprising of the OAS the Communists turned their propaganda efforts
towards eliminating the OAS and its supporters who were attempting to subvert the peace talks
between the Algerians and the French.
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Figure 28

Source: White, L‘association nationale pour le soutien de l‘action du général de Gaulle
Context: Referendum for self-determination
Time: 1961
Audience: French and Algerians
Medium: Poster
Subject: Vote Yes to the referendum for self-determination in Algeria
Mission: Peace
Printer: Matot-Braine, Reims
Translation: ―YES for a New Algeria, YES for friendship, YES for de Gaulle‖

De Gaulle has become the image for Algerian propaganda, and such leaflets as those
mentioned under the previous chapter focusing on Algerians are now non-existent. ―C‘est le
chef, le libérateur qui est mis en avant, comme en 1961 pour le référendum, où il lève les bras,
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avec juste le rappel dans un des trios slogans du ‗oui‘ pour l‘Algérie Nouvelle‖ (Gervereau, La
France 180).8
De Gaulle here is raising his hands upwards while standing in front of the drapeau
tricolore as if he is declaring himself as France‘s guide of the future (Gervereau, La propagande
142). The repetition of ―oui‖ along with his outstretched hand forming a ―V‖ gives a sense of
hope, peace and friendship between Algeria and France through the approval of the referendum.
De Gaulle appears as though he is the white part of the flag symbolizing his pure intentions for
the future of France and Algeria. Placing de Gaulle in front of the drapeau tricolore is also a
visual symbol of power and gives him credibility as the protector of France.

The poster uses

colors, yet de Gaulle appears in black and white. This is done so that the de Gaulle that appears
on this poster is the same as the de Gaulle that all French and Algerians have seen on their black
and white televisions.
The text of this poster follows a logical progression; a new Algeria equals friendship
which has come about through de Gaulle (Gervereau, La France 142). The outcome of the
referendum on January 8, 1956, resulted in a resounding ―oui‖ for the self-determination of
Algeria. De Gaulle became the hero for those hoping for an Independent Algeria, but betrayed
those hoping to maintain a French Algeria.

8

This poster has received much attention but I have chosen to include it due to its popularity and
relevance to the subject at hand.
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Figure 29

Source: White, French Army
Context: Evian Accords
Time: 1962
Audience: French and Algerians
Medium: Initially it was a leaflet but then became a poster
Subject: Initiating the phases towards self-determination
Mission: Self-determination
Translation: ―Peace in Algeria for our children‖

This leaflet became one of the most famous posters of the end of the war9. It was initially
in a leaflet distributed to the French military outlining the necessary steps to self-determination:
cease-fire, transition period, self-determination. The French used this leaflet portraying innocent
children in an attempt to convince the rebels to lay down their weapons of war not for

9

For copyright purposes, the image of this leaflet in the form of a poster is not shown, but can be
accessed at the following website: http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/2672704/Hulton-Archive.
75

themselves but for their children. This image illustrates the importance of bringing peace to
Algeria.
The two children, of whom one of them is clearly Algerian, are happy and smiling. The
young French boy has his arm around the Algerian girl as a friendly gesture; the young Algerian
girl likewise has her arm around the boy. The young boy‘s arm around the Algerian girl‘s
shoulder is used to illustrate the influence of the French on the Algerians. The boy also seems to
be older and looking down on the Algerian, demonstrating the ―big brother‖ role played by the
French.
The text is simple yet poignant. The eye is naturally drawn to the picture and then to the
text above the image declaring, ―For our children‖. The text is a plea for peace for the children
who have lived through the events of the war. Innocent children were harmed during the war as
is seen in the following image from an edition of Paris Match, so this leaflet was a poignant
reminder of the results of the combatant‘s actions.

Figure 30
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Figure 31

Source: White, Gaullists
Context: Voting for the Referendum of 1962, Evian Accords
Time: 1962
Audience: Algerians and French
Medium: Poster
Artist: Darigo
Subject: Pass the referendum
Mission: Bring peace to Algeria and to France
Translation: ―Yes to Peace‖

This poster by Pierre Paul Darigo, a famous French graphic designer who served in
Algeria during the war, is an attempt to encourage the French to vote ―oui‖ for peace on the
referendum of 1962 concerning the independence of Algeria. The interesting aspect of this
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poster is the fact that neither of these children appear to be of Arabic decent, which is in stark
contrast to the poster Pour nos enfants la paix en Algérie, it seems as if Algeria has been
forgotten (Gervereau, La France 181). Because of this lack of Algerian presence in this poster it
appears that Darigo is demonstrating that voting ―oui‖ to the referendum will not only bring
peace to France and Algeria, but will bring inner peace.
The wheat in the bottom right of the image evokes the emotions of prosperity and
nourishment. The three flowers in the bottom right consist of two tulips and a daisy representing
the three colors of the republic, ―bleu, blanc, rouge‖. According to floriography, also known as
the language of flowers which was introduced in the renaissance but became very popular in the
Victorian era as a means of sending a coded message, states that a blue tulip symbolizes
tranquility and peace, a white daisy symbolized purity and a red tulip symbolizes a declaration of
love. The combination of the flowers and the wheat are included in the propaganda poster in
order to associate the peace brought on by the voting of ―oui‖ for the referendum with the
prosperity of peace for the republic.
The most prominent part of this poster is the word ―OUI‖ written in bold and all-caps.
The word is written in yellow which is a symbol of happiness and joy, once again leading to the
idea that a vote of ―oui‖ for the referendum would bring happiness and joy. ―In the pairing of
blue and yellow, yellow is the male colour, the colour of light and life, and can never be
darkened‖ (Chevalier 1137). The use of blue as a background helps to bring out the color yellow
and the outline of the individuals.
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7. CONCLUSION
The analysis and evaluation of propaganda cannot be done through tests because reality can
never be duplicated due to the fact that the individual or society is placed in different situations
than existed in the original context. Thus, the evaluation of propaganda will be done by
determining the intent of the propagandist and then analyzing the effects.
This chapter will be divided into 5 sections. The evaluation of the propaganda will be
done by analyzing differences, similarities, patterns and the evolution of the propaganda. The
effects and outcomes of the propaganda will then be discussed. Finally the in/effectiveness of
French propaganda will be analyzed.
Similarities and Differences
There are similarities and differences in the diffusion of propaganda between the French and the
FLN. One of these similarities is the distribution of leaflets and the propagation of messages
through word of mouth. The French used word of mouth propaganda by sending propaganda
officers to villages throughout Algeria in order to persuade the general population to remain
French and to become informants. The FLN‘s use of propagating messages through word of
mouth existed mostly in the Casbah where there was a very dense population of native Algerians.
The distribution of leaflets by the French was done by dropping them from helicopters, whereas
the FLN passed them from hand to hand. The big difference between the two sides in the
diffusion of propaganda is the use of posters by the French. The French would use boards with
propaganda attached placed in common areas. If the FLN were to attempt this, the propaganda
would be confiscated and destroyed immediately. It is for this reason that the FLN resorted
mainly to the use of leaflets and word of mouth.
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Propaganda during the war was prevalent and as previously stated, was at the forefront of
the action on the ground. The propaganda by the FLN was mostly done through small leaflets,
graffiti or through word of mouth; ―one did not see it anywhere, it had no visible surface, and yet
it existed‖ (Ellul, FLN Propaganda 16). As previously quoted, Saadi Yacef stated, ―le FLN n‘a
jamais cessé d‘être lié au peuple par le comité politique : propagande chuchotée ou écrite‖ (34).
As explained by Yacef, FLN propaganda was handwritten or whispered and due to this, there is a
lack of physical propaganda emanating from the FLN.
Another difference between French and FLN propaganda can be seen in the messages
propagated. At the beginning of the war the French attempted to demonize the rebels and the
rebellion, whereas the FLN attempted to glorify their position in claiming that those who had
died had become martyrs and heroes: ―Mais l‘âme de la Révolution algérienne restait vivante au
cœur de ce peuple persécuté dont les héros obscurs se comptent par dizaines de milliers‖ (Yacef
71). The FLN also attempted to demonize the French as is seen in Figure 25, Harkis!, showing
the massacre at Sétif.
Patterns
Patterns can be found in the propaganda during the war. Such patterns are the use of color and
certain colors, the use of specific images, the prominence of the image, the prominence of the
text, the amount of text and the text to image ratio.
Most of the leaflets were black and white while the posters dating towards the end of the
war were mostly printed in color. There is a pattern in the color scheme of the posters; most
contained the color blue, which signifies loftiness and often purity. Yellow was also used when
discussing voting ―oui‖ for the referendum. The colors of the drapeau tricolore, blue, white and
red, were also often used to illustrate French identity.
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Specific images were used to evoke certain ideas or thoughts. The use of violent images
was used to bring fear to the targeted audience, such as Figures 15, Veux-tu toujours connaître le
barrage, and 16, Les chacals se mangent entre eux. The images used in Figure 15 are intended
to be used as a scare tactic in order to deter individuals from crossing the border along Tunisia
and Morocco. Peaceful images were used in contradiction to the violent images; they created a
positive reinforcement of the idea of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as is seen in Figure 31,
Oui à la paix. The image of de Gaulle was also widely used after his coming to power in order
to inspire a sense of nationalism and patriotism, making reference to his role in the French
Resistance during World War II.
An image is often intended to speak louder than the words written on a leaflet or poster.
Due to this, the image is given prominence over the text. This is seen in quite a few of the
images that have been analyzed. In Figure 29, Pour nos enfants la paix en Algérie, the image of
the two children playing in peace is intended to be more powerful than the words and thus the
image is placed centrally on the document and takes up most of the space. Figure 11, Parlons
pour defender notre vie, along with Figure 16, Les chacals se mangent entre eux, are similar in
that the image is more predominant than the text.
When the text is intended to provide the primary content of the message it is given
prominence over the image. Leaflets are often intended to be text heavy because individuals are
able to look over the documents on their own time and at their own speed. These leaflets are not
made to be fully comprehended through a quick glance. In contrast to leaflets, posters are
intended to have minimal amounts of text but contain symbolic images where the message can
be gleaned almost instantaneously. Figure 25, Harkis!, is an example of a very text heavy leaflet
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where the words are given prominence and the image is only provided in order to reinforce the
text.
Evolution of Propaganda
French propaganda throughout the war evolved and changed as the historical context changed.
French propaganda during the beginning of the war as mentioned, attempted to demonize the
FLN as seen in Figure 16, Les chacals se mangent entre eux, and Figure 9, Qui te délivrera,
where the FLN are portrayed as venomous scorpions. The propaganda then evolved into
attempts to encourage informants such as Figures 11, Parlons pour defender notre vie, and 12,
Tout le monde parle. Propaganda directed towards those fighting for the FLN then encouraged
them to desert and return to French society as is seen in Figure 13, Engage-toi. Later, after the
paix des braves, leaflets came to focus more on desertion and became travel passes. After de
Gaulle‘s speech on self-determination, propaganda shifted towards a peaceful resolution to the
conflict and encouraged a vote of ―oui‖ for the referendums.
Effects of Propaganda
The desired results of the propaganda campaigns of both sides were the same as the military
goals; the FLN desired their independence from the yoke of colonialism while the French desired
to maintain the status quo. The results of the FLN propaganda were effective and yielded the
desired result while the French failed to achieve their goal and eventually granted Algeria its
independence. The FLN attempted to gain international support through demonstrating the
oppressive nature of their role as the colonized, and this international support was perhaps more
important than what happened domestically; and today, through social media, is what empowers
modern day revolts against oppression. This international support aided their attempts to
accomplish the fight for independence.
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Propaganda alone may not have the ability to change attitudes and opinions; it is the
dialogue conducted between individuals concerning the message which influences the changing
of behaviors and attitudes. It is expected that propaganda would have had a greater influence on
the outcome of the war, but what is often overlooked is the importance of dialogue in
propaganda. The FLN was able to get the international community and eventually the French
general population to create a dialogue discussing the ending of colonialism and an Algerian
Algeria. It is this dialogue which aided the Algerians in their cause even though the propaganda
messages themselves may not have directly changed behavior.
In/Effectiveness of Propaganda during the War
In order for the French to win the war they needed to have won the war of ideas and destroyed
the FLN‘s support, ―Pour l‘armée française, il fallait détruire le F.L.N. et l‘A.L.N., en détruisant
en même temps leur soutien populaire‖ (Yacef 32). The only effective way to eliminate popular
support was through propaganda. The French put a lot of effort in attempting to do this, as is
seen through the analysis of propaganda in the previous chapters. The question then remains
―why was this propaganda not effective?‖
First of all, what makes propaganda effective? In order for propaganda to be effective,
the propagandist‘s message must be accepted and integrated into the lives of the target audience,
it has to appeal to their senses. If the message fails to reach the target audience and instigate a
change in opinions and beliefs then it is considered ineffective. The source, context, time,
audience, and medium of the propaganda are all essential elements that lead to the effectiveness
of propaganda. If even one of these elements is inaccurate then the message is likely to be
looked over and deemed as erroneous. There is also much research showing that one-way
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communication, if not backed by force, is not ultimately effective in changing attitudes—only in
gaining awareness.
According to Jacques Ellul, French propaganda during the war was ineffective. He states,
―Indeed the only part of it with any effect from 1957 to 1960 was that which influenced young
people to join the military in Algeria. In consequence the only useful purpose served by it is that
of standing as an object lesson in failure to qualify as real propaganda‖ (FLN Propaganda 15).
French propaganda in Algeria had created a boomerang effect, meaning that ―knowing that
someone is trying to coerce us may even prompt us to react in the opposite direction‖ (Myers
218). This boomerang effect reinforces preexisting opinions and beliefs rather than changing
them, it in fact instigates anti-conformity. ―The theory of psychological reactance—that people
act to protect their sense of freedom—is supported by experiments showing that attempts to
restrict a person‘s freedom often produce an anticonformity ‗boomerang effect‘‖ (Myers 218).
French propaganda can also be seen as ineffective due to the lack of an ideology that
appealed to the Algerians. Through the revolution Algerians would gain rights and freedoms
which they had been refused. If the revolutionaries were to put down their weapons of war and
work towards peace in a French Algeria, nothing would have changed, nothing would incite
them to do so. They had been oppressed for so long that a return to the status quo was not an
option, thus the message of a French Algeria propagated by the French was ineffective.
The Algerian‘s saw their cause as just, an attempt to rid them of an unjust and oppressive
colonial system. But, it was not until 1956 that support for the Algerian nation became a
widespread ideological thought, ―[Ferhat] Abbas once wrote, in an oft-quoted passage: ‗I will not
die for the Algerian fatherland, because it does not exist…In any case no one believes seriously
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in our ‗nationalism‘‖ (Ellul, FLN Propaganda 10). After 1956, support for Algerian nationalism
grew exponentially; Abdelhamid Boudiaf in a letter dated March 5, 1959, states:
Il y a une idée générale qui ne doit pas être sous-estimée : c‘est la détermination du
peuple algérien de se débarrasser du colonialisme, ce qui met en relief que ni la
répression féroce, ni les erreurs des dirigeants, ni la mauvaise organisation, ou la nonorganisation de l‘octroi et l‘acheminement des armes et munitions, n‘ont entamé la
volonté de lutte du peuple. Elle est là, on la rencontre chez les djoundi, le paysan, la
femme, le berger. Et c‘est cette volonté qui soutient à l‘intérieur l‘esprit de lutte. Elle est
la plus déterminante de tous. (Harbi 235)
Thus, it is the determination of the Algerian population to liberate them from the colonial system
that hindered the effectiveness of French Propaganda. Aït-Hamouda Amirouche, an ALN
General in the Kabylie, has also stated the importance of independence for the Algerian
population:
To the Algerian, the Algerian war is not an armed conflict the same as any other. It is a
sacred war that puts into question his entire being, his very existence, and the foundation
of that existence and not only certain modalities of that existence.
This translates into a human attitude and into language. Their consciousness [conscience
aiguë] of their situation adds to the extreme susceptibility of Algerians, to their
excessively proud character [leur caractère ombrageux], something tight and strained.
In this debate, France does not run the risks of disappearing. For Algeria, on the contrary,
which has already sacrificed hundreds of thousands of its own, it is really a matter of
being or not being. This alone is enough to create a distance that is difficult to do away
with between the French and Algerians. (qtd. in Le Sueur 193)
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The Algerians will go to extremes in order to achieve their goal, independence, due to the
―sacred‖ nature of the war. Cultural divergence theory plays a strong role in this, as well. That
says that messages coming from foreign sources are viewed skeptically by domestic audiences
anyway – and we tend to prefer our own messages. As partly discussed in the nationalism
discussion above, when the French were trying to win support of the Algerians, they were always
the outsiders, even when they had the power. Once that started to break down, I‘m not sure what,
if anything, the French could have done to win back the hearts of the majority of Algerians.
The ineffectiveness of French propaganda can be linked to the fact that anti-colonial
sentiment had been propagated and persisted among the Algerians for a while. From the 1920‘s
and 30‘s the Algerian nationalistic movement began, and in 1943, Ferhat Abbas issued the
Manifeste du Peuple Algérien, declaring the end of Algerian support for assimilation into French
society. This is similar to the reason why the German‘s continued fighting relentlessly at the end
of World War II, it was a result of ―Nazi education—in other words, propaganda, propaganda
that exalted sacrifice, war, military values, faith in the führer, the common weal, the superiority
and invincibility of the German race. Such propaganda had begun fifteen years earlier, i.e. had
had time to take effect‖ (Ellul, Propaganda 284). Similarly, the idea of an Algerian Algeria had
begun years before and had time to take effect and mature in the minds of the general population.
Even though the general population did not believe in their nationalism until 1956, as previously
stated, the idea had time to ferment and gain ardent supporters.
While France was adamant that the conflict in Algeria was an internal matter, the
Algerians were attempting to gain support on the international level through anti-colonialist
propaganda. The United States itself was involved in questioning whether this was an internal
matter or an international concern. Desiring to respect its longest ally while still defeating
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imperialism and bringing freedom to all as is shown in a speech by John F. Kennedy on July 2,
1957, entitled, ―Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom‖. Algeria also gained support from the
United Nations whose policies and views were in opposition to colonialism. The French argued
that Algeria was an integral part of France while the United Nations simply saw it as a colony.
―The war and colonialism had demonstrated that the French were lost in Eurocentric rhetoric and
concerned only with the war‘s effect on the French conceptions of selfhood‖ (Le Sueur 183).
The combination of the Algerian determination for independence and the inability of the
French to persuade the masses resulted in a humiliating loss for the French forces and the loss of
territory deemed integral to French society. After over 130 years of colonial rule, and through 8
grueling years of revolutionary war, Algeria received its independence.
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APPENDIX
Important Dates/Chronology of the war
June, 18, 1954
Pierre Mendès-France becomes Prime Minister
November 1, 1954
The FLN launches armed rebellions throughout Algeria calling for an
autonomous state
February 23, 1954
Edgar Faure becomes Prime Minister
January 26 1955 –
Jacques-Emile Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria
February 1, 1956
August 20, 1955
Massacre at Phillipeville
November 29, 1955 Prime Minister dissolves the National Assembly and calls for new
elections
January 31, 1956
Guy Mollet becomes Prime Minister
February 1, 1956 –
Georges Alber Julien Catroux, Governor General of Algeria
February 9, 1956
February 6, 1956
Guy Mollet visits Algeria and is attacked by a mob
February 9, 1956 –
Robert Lacoste, Governor General of Algeria
May 14, 1958
March 16, 1956
Special Powers Law giving the executive virtually unlimited power
August 20, 1956
Soummam Congress
October 31, 1956 –
Suez Expedition
November 6, 1956
End of 1956
400,000 French soldiers in North Africa
January 7, 1957
The Tenth Paratroop Division enters Algiers
January 28, 1957
General 8 day strike
January 7 – October Battle of Algiers
8, 1957
June 12, 1957
Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury becomes Prime Minister
November 6, 1957
Félix Gaillard becomes Prime Minister
February 8, 1958
French Air Force bombs a Tunisian village known to be aiding the FLN
May 13, 1958
Pierre Pflimlin becomes Prime Minister
Committee of Public Safety created
May 14, 1958
De Gaulle declares that he is ready to assume the powers of the republic
June 1, 1958
Charles de Gaulle becomes Prime Minister
September 19, 1958 The FLN becomes the Gouvernement provisoire de la République
algérienne (GPRA) with Ferhat Abbas as president
October 5, 1958
5th Republic is formed with a new constitution
October 23, 1958
De Gaulle offers la paix des braves
December 21, 1958
De Gaulle becomes the first president of the 5th republic
February 6, 1959
Beginning of the Challe Offensive
January 24, 1960
La semaine des barricades (The barricades week)
June 1960
Si Salah Affair
December 3, 1960
Organization of the Organisation de l‘armée secrete (OAS)
January 8, 1961
Referendum concerning the organization of public authority in Algeria
and self-determination
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April 21-26, 1961
March 18, 1962
March 19, 1962
July 3, 1962
July 5, 1962

The Coup d‘Etat d‘Algiers also known as the Putsch d‘Alger
Evian Accords
Cease Fire
De Gaulle declares Algeria independent
Algerian Independence
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